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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SOLOMON LEE FORD,
Petitioner/Appellee,
Case No. 20060720
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/ Appellant

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

CASE STATEMENT
Ford was serving a one-to-fifteen-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm by a
restricted person. In his case statement, Ford asserts that the "underlying basis for [his]
conviction is thin enough - possession of a dangerous weapon, where no functional weapon was
ever found, let alone produced as evidence

" Appellee's Brief at 6. Ford provides no record

citation for this assertion. Therefore, the Court should disregard it Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7).1

1

If the Court does not disregard the statement, then the State asks that it take judicial
notice of the record from the underlying criminal case. (The State will refer to the criminal
record as "CR," and the post-conviction record as "PCR.") The State's uncontradicted
evidence at trial established that Ford, a convicted bank robber, walked into his girlfriend's
apartment cleaning what looked like a shotgun barrel. Ford then pointed a small-caliber,
chrome handgun at his girlfriend's male friend, cocked it, and told him to leave. (Ford's
girlfriend testified that Ford asked her friend to leave and that, when Ford did, he had
something silver in his hand.) Both witnesses also saw Ford carrying shotgun shells at this
time. Although police never found the handgun or the shotgun barrel, there was no
evidence to contradict the eye-witness testimony that Ford had both. Upon searching the

Ford also asserts that he was acquitted on die assault charge and refers only to R52.
Appellee's Brief at 10. PCR52 includes only die State's recitation diat he was convicted on die
weapons charge, not diat Ford was acquitted on die assault charge.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ford asserts that the standard of review for appointing counsel undet Utah Const Art
I, § 12, is "abuse of discretion." Appellee's Brief at 3. However, die issue is whedier the postconviction court properly interpreted section 12 as giving Ford the right to counsel for this post-,
conviction appeal This Court reviews a lower court's constitutional interpretations for
correctness. Seer t.g Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31 \ 7,153 P3d 540.
ARGUMENT
L

THAT FORD HAS SERVED MOST OF HIS SENTENCE HAS NO
RELEVANCE TO WHETHER TfidE KteT-CONVICTION COURT
CORRECTLY SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION
Ford was serving a one-to-fifteen-year sentence on his conviction for possession of a

apartment where Ford had stayed for two days prior to threatening a man with small-caliber,
semi-automatic handgu^ they found a holstet diat would fit £ small-caliber, seiM-autoftiatic
handgun. They also found a red gym bag in die apartment that contained a shotgun stock
and shotgiift shells* A police officer testified diat thfe only pieee of die shotgufi missing from
die pieces found in die gym bag was die barrel The renter's son testified diat Ford left
things at their apartment and brought gym bags with him. Although he could not identify
die red gym bag as one of Ford's, he testified that it was not his, his younger brother's, or, to
his knowledge, his mother's. Ford's girlfriend testified that Ford had carried a red gym bag
similar to the one police found from the trunk of his car to the apartment where police
found die red gym bag widi die shotgun parts and shells. (CR580-82 587-88, 591-92,59597,613-14,629-93.)
2

Again, if the Court does not disregard the statement, it should take judicial notice of
the criminal record, which establishes that die State moved to dismiss the aggravated assault
charge, and the trial court granted the motion (CR773-74).
2

firearm by a restricted person. Ford recites that he had served thirteen years of that sentence
when, in his fourth post-conviction action, he convinced a court to set aside his conviction and
let him out of prison. See, e.g.y Appellee's Brief at 1,14.
To the extent Ford invites this Court to affirm based on some notion that he has served
enough of his sentence, the law forecloses that consideration. The Board of Pardons and
Paroles, not the judiciary, has sole authority to determine how much time Ford should serve on
his unchallenged sentence. See, e.g., Foote v. Utah Bd ofPardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991).
The Board concluded that Ford should serve allfifteenyears. Apparendy, he did not do what
the Board would have considered sufficient to grant him early release. This Court has no
authority to circumvent that determination by affirming an order setting aside the conviction on
which it was based. It may affirm only if the decision to set aside the conviction was legally
correct For the reasons argued, it was not
II.

FORD HAS NOT CARRIED HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HIS
CLAIM IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED
By its own terms, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act applies to all post-conviction

proceedings that, like Ford's fourth post-conviction petition, were initiated after the PCRA's
effective date. Utah Code § 78B-9-103 (2008). Further, the PCRA plainly bars Ford's claims
and no PCRA exceptions apply. § 78B-9-106(l)(d).
Ford does not argue the contrary. Rather, Ford argues that this action falls "squarely
within the historical scope of the Court's constitutional [writ] authority" because it purports to
challenge the trial court's jurisdiction to try Ford in the first place. From this, Ford concludes
that the PCRA does not apply at all; therefore, the PCRA procedural bar rules could not bar
3

merits review of Ford's fourth post-conviction claims. He also appears to argue that no
common law procedural bars apply, and, alternatively, that the Court should find "good cause"
to forgive the procedural bars and reach his claim's merits. Appellee's Brief at 14-22. The law
supports none of Ford's arguments.
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42 fflf 1748, 94 P.3d 26, refutes Ford's argument that the
PCRA and its procedural bar rules do not apply at all, as well as his apparent assumption that
the PCRA and constitutional post-conviction review are mutually exclusive.3 In Gardner, this
Court held that the PCRA and its procedural bar rules apply to all post-conviction cases that,
like Ford's fourth petition, were filed after the PCRA's effective date. The Court further held
that it would defer to the PCRA's procedural bar exceptions that incorporated the pre-PCRA
common law exceptions. The Court continued only that the Court's common law procedural
bar exceptions that had not been incorporated into the PCRA retained their "constitutional

3

Ford cites three cases for the apparent proposition that the legislature may impose no
restrictions on post-conviction review: Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Frausto v.
State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), and State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,127 P.3d 682. Appellee's
Brief at 16, 22. However, Julian and Barrettwere not PCRA cases. Julian was decided under
pre-PCRA law. Julian, 966 P.2d at 250 (petition filed under former, pre-PCEA Utah R, Civ.
P. 65B). See also Julian v. State, 52 P.3d 1168,1170-71 (Utah 2002) (holding that the PCRA
did not apply to Julian's post-conviction action because he commenced it before the PCRA's
effective date). Barrett involved the State's rule 65B extraordinary relief petition, claiming
that a district court judge had exceeded his authority. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,127 P.3d
682. That case, and present rule 65B have nothing to do with collateral review of a criminal
conviction. Id.; Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (excluding from its coverage cases governed by Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C and, by necessary extension, the PCRA). Frausto did address a PCRA action.
Ford asserts that this Court recognized in Frausto that "'no statute of limitations may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition."' Appellee's Brief at 22 (quoting Frausto, 966
P.2d at 851.) He apparently relies on this language to suggest that the legislature may set no
limits on the availability of collateral relief from a conviction. However, Ford misstates this
as the Court's opinion: only one justice joined that reasoning.
4

significance." Id. atfflf13-19.4 Thus, under Gardner, Ford may avoid the PCRA's procedural bar
only if he can establish that an unincorporated common law exception excuses the applicable
procedural bars. He has not done so.
Ford appears to argue that no procedural bar applies to his fourth petition because he
purports to challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Appellee's Brief at 15-19. That
is not the law. In Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), this Court recognized that a
challenge to a trial court's jurisdiction has always been permitted in a collateral proceeding. Id.
at 1034. However, the Court also recognized that successive petitions are barred unless the
petitioner can establish '"unusual circumstances'" or '"good cause"' to justify reaching the merits
of claims raised in a successive petition. Id. at 1037 (citation omitted). The Court included a list
of examples of "good cause" that would excuse the default and permit merits review in a
successive petition. Id. Noticeably absent from that list is a challenge to a trial court's subject
matter jurisdiction even though the Court recognized that such challenges were a traditional
basis for habeas relief. Id.5
A

Tht State acknowledges, as it must, that this Court has concluded that the judicial
branch has state constitutional authority for post-conviction review of a criminal conviction
under. Gardner, 2004 UT 42fflf17-18. The State does not agree that the Court decided
Gardner correctly and reserves its right to challenge Gardner'in future cases. However,
because Ford has not met his burden to establish that even the common law procedural bar
exceptions require merits review of his fourth-petition claim, the State has chosen to argue
the case under the existing precedent
5

Ford cites Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968) for the proposition that "lack
of jurisdiction precludes all procedural bars." Appellee's Brief at 18. Ford misstates Sullivan.
At most, Sullivan stands for the proposition that a jurisdictional challenge may be raised in a
first post-conviction petition. It does not support Ford's sweeping assertion that a
jurisdictional challenge "precludes all procedural bars" no matter how many prior petitions
the convicted person has filed. As explained in the text, Hurst stands for the contrary
5

Ford also has not established that any common law exception applies.6 Both the PCRA
and the common law bar relief based on claims that the petitioner has litigated and lost in a prior
proceeding, and neither recognizes any exception. § 78B-9-106(l)(d); Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT
96 f 15; 44 P.3d 626. As detailed in Appellant's Brief, Ford litigated and lost in his third petition
the same jurisdictional challenge that he litigated and won in his fourth petition. Appellant's
Brief at 10-12. That is, he argued in both that his beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conviction was
illegal because a commissioner bound him over for trial on that charge.
Ford argues that the fourth-petition jurisdictional claim differs from the third-petition
jurisdictional claim.

According to Ford, his third-petition claim "stemmed from an

unconstitutional delegation [of judicial authority], not a violation" of his right to a preliminary
hearing. Appellee's Brief at 20.
However, as Ford recognizes, the substance of the action rather than the label controls.
Appellee's Brief at 17-18 n.8. Both claims depended on the same argument that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to try him because the legislature unconstitutionally delegated to
commissioners the authority to preside at preliminary hearings. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The
claim that Ford contends was new in his fourth petition depended on the same jurisdictional
argument that Ford raised and lost in his third. Because he raised no substantively different

proposition.
6

Both the PCRA and common law place the burden of establishing an exception on
Ford. § 78B-9-105; Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.
6

claim in his fourth-petition, it was procedurally barred. See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.7
Ford also asserts that the third post-conviction court did not dispose of his jurisdictional
challenge because it purportedly "expressly construed the pro se petition as not raising a
jurisdictional challenge." Appellee's Brief at 19 (emphasis in Appellee's Brief). He relies on the
third post-conviction court's conclusion that Ford's third petition did not "state" a challenge to
the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to try him. Id.
Again, Ford promotes form over substance because the third post-conviction court
resolved against Ford the basis for his fourth-petition challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction.
In his fourth petition, Ford alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him because a
commissioner served as the magistrate at his preliminary hearing. The third post-conviction
court concluded in an alternative merits ruling that allowing a commissioner to preside at Ford's
preliminary hearing was not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.8

7

Ford takes issue with the State's argument that he was not entitled to raise his
jurisdictional argument in successive petitions until he found a post-conviction court that
agreed with him. According to Ford, that "is precisely what the writ of habeas corpus
entitles him to do," relying on a footnote in Hurst Appellee's Brief at 21 n.10. However, the
footnote to which Ford cites refers to a "commentator[cs]" "bit of relevant history
concerning habeas corpus." Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1035 n.4. Hurst does not adopt that historical
view that petitioners are entitled to repeated merits determinations of the same claim. As
established in the text, Hurst stands for the contrary proposition.
8

Ford also misreads the third post-conviction court's conclusion. In the third postconviction action, the State acknowledged that Ford's unconstitutional-delegation claim
appeared to be a challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to try him (PCR64). The State
continued, however, that Ford had established no jurisdictional defect (PCR64-65). The
third post-conviction court concluded that the unconstitutional-delegation claim "d(id] not
state a challenge to the [trial court's] jurisdiction to try [Ford]" (PCR54-55). In context, the
third post-conviction court concluded that Ford had not established a jurisdictional defect,
not that he had not attempted to raise a jurisdictional challenge.
Ford also suggests that the State has conceded that the third- and fourth-petition

7

Even if the litigated-and-lost procedural bar does not apply, the could-have-been raised
bar does. Ford argues, however, that the default should be excused under Hurst because it
would be "fundamentally unfair" not to excuse his failure to raise the fourth-petition claim in
his third petition. In support, he argues that this court decided Jones v. Utah Bd. ofPardons and
Paroles, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, between his third and fourth petitions. He alleges that Jones
sheds new light on his unconstitutional delegation argument Therefore, according to Ford, it
would be fundamentally unfair not to re-assess that claim in light of Jones. Appellee's Brief at
21-22.
However, newly decided authority will excuse the successive-petition bar only when it
applies retroactively and would entitle the petitioner to relief. See, e.g., Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036.
Cf also Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (holding that petitioners were not entitled to
post-conviction relief based on a new rule of law decided after their convictions became final
on direct appeal because the new rule did not apply retroactively).9 Ford has not argued, let
alone established that Jones applies retroactively. Further, even if Jones applied retroactively, it
would not affect the outcome of Ford's case. Jones holds only that the unconstitutional delegation
of judicial authority doctrine does not apply to the board of pardons because it is not a court of
record. Jones, 2004 UT 53 ^ 17. It does not hold that the probable cause determination and

claims differed. Appellee's Brief at 20. Rather, the State consistently argued that Ford raised
and lost in his third petition the claim that he raised in his fourth petition (PCR47-47,106107). The State argued only in the alternative that, if the fourth post-conviction 6ourt
construed the claim as different from that raised in the third petition, then the claim was still
barred as one that could have been, but was not raised in the third petition (PCR107).
^ e PCRA inferentially incorporates this exception. Gardner, 2004 UT 42 ^[14.
8

bindover by a court commissioner robbed the district court of jurisdiction to try Ford.
In sum, Ford has never sustained his burden of overcoming the procedural bar under
either the PCRA or the common law. The Court should reverse the fourth post-conviction
court without reaching the merits of his claim. However, even if the Court were to excuse
Ford's default, his claim fails on its merits as explain in points III and IV.
III.

THE JURY'S UNCONTESTED BEYOND-A-REASONABJLE-DOUBT
GUILTY VERDICT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE A QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICER
MADE THE UNCONTESTED PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION TO
BIND FORD OVER FOR TRIAL
Article I, section 13 provides that "[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by

indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate — " At the time of Ford's section 13 hearing, "magistrate," by statue, included court
commissioners. § 77-1-3 (1993).
According to Ford, however, the "magistrate" referred to in Article 1, section 13, must
mean an Article VIII judge. From this, Ford argues that the unchallenged beyond-a-reasonabledoubt jury verdict was null because a law-trained commissioner with criminal law experience
rather than Article VIII judge made the unchallenged determination that the evidence was
sufficient to establish probable cause that Ford committed the crime for which a jury later
convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt Appellee's Brief at 22-34.
In the end, Ford cites no case, and the State knows of none, where this Court or the
court of appeals has overturned an uncontested beyond-a-reasonable-doubt guilty verdict
because a court commissioner, a "quasi-judicial officer," made the uncontested probable-cause
determination that resulted in binding the defendant over for trial Ford cites only State v. Ortega,
9

751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. PetHt, 93 P.2d 675 (Utah 1939); and State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860
(Utah 1918). Appellee's Brief at 33. However, in all three cases, this Court vacated the
convictions because the defendant had been bound over on a crime different from that on
which the jury later convicted him. Ortega, 751 P.2d at 1139-40; Pettit, 93 P.2d at 676-77; Nelson,
176 P. at 860-62. Ford was bound over and tried on the same crime.10 Compare State v. Marsha/I,
2005 UT App 269U at 1 (holding that the jury verdict was valid because "Marshall received a
preliminary hearing consistent with the charge bound over"), cert, denied, 124 P.3d 634 (2005).11
The cases that Ford cites on section 13's history and policy contradict rather than support
his argument that only an Article VIII judge may serve as a section 13 magistrate. That is, they
establish that a section 13 examination and commitment by a court commissioner provided to

10

Ford cites all three for the proposition that "[w]here a defendant does not waive his
right to have each charge against him first presented to a magistrate, and yet the State fails to
do so, the trial court cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction.99 Appellee's Brief at 33 (emphasis
added). However, none of those cases actually held that a section 13 hearing and
commitment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to trial. Further, the real defect in the preliminary
hearings at issue was the lack of notice. That is, the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing varied significantly from the evidence on which the jury later convicted the
defendants. Ford has never alleged that the evidence presented at his preliminary hearing
varied from that on which the jury later convicted him or that any unidentified variance
prejudiced him.
n

Ford states that "[t]he State concedes that ca preliminary hearing and bindover are
"essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony... ."' Appellee's Brief at 30. Ford's
statement is correct However, the State never has conceded that a preliminary hearing
before an Article VIII judge is a pre-requisite to a trial court's jurisdiction, and the argument
here an in Appellant's Brief at 15-30 establishes otherwise. Further, the State made its
concession in the court of appeals based on controlling court of appeals authority.
Appellant's Brief at 22-23, citing Marshal, 2005 UT App 269U. Since the State made that
concession, this Court has called Marshal into question. See, e.g., State v. RAinehart, 2007 UT 61
fflf 19-20,167 P.3d 1046. RAinehart states that this Court is not bound by Marshal 2nd states
the broad proposition that a subsequent jury verdict cures defects in the preliminary hearing.
Id.
10

Ford all of the protections that section 13 afforded.
'The fundamental purpose served by [a section 13 examination and commitment] is the
ferreting out of groundless and improvident prosecutions. The effectuation of this primarypurpose relieves the accused from the substantial degradation and expense incident to a modern
criminal trial when the charges against him are unwarranted or the evidence insufficient" Ortega,
751 R2d at 1140. See also, e.g, State v. Bricky,7UP.2d6U, 646 (Ut&

Fordgotthis. The

court commissioner heard evidence supporting the charges against Ford, found that the
prosecution was not groundless, and bound Ford over for trial. Ford's subsequent conviction
beyond-a-reasonable doubt substantiated that determination. The examination and commitment
before the court commissioner shielded Ford "from the substantial degradation and expense"
of a criminal trial on groundless charges. Cf, e.g., RAinebart, 2007 UT 61 ^[20 (a jury verdict cures
preliminary hearing defects). See also, e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 41(26,128 P.3d 1171 (same).
The State agrees with Ford that, to effectuate section 13's purpose, the person who
examines the evidence and commits the defendant for trial must be "neutral and detached."
Appellee's Brief at 29. That is, a section 13 examination and commitment protects against
prosecutorial abuses that may result from prosecutors having unsupervised power to institute
a prosecution. By necessary extension, the person who makes that determination cannot be
beholden to the prosecutor.12
12

That is the principle for which Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US. 443 (1971), on
which Ford relies (Appellee's Brief at 29), stands. Coolidge involved a New Hampshire law
that allowed the prosecuting official to serve as the magistrate who issued search warrants.
Id. at 447. Thus, the entity investigating the defendant was the same entity that issued a
search warrant to assist in that investigation. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that
the New Hampshire statute violated Coolidge's Fourth Amendment rights because the
11

Again, Ford got this benefit The statutory "magistrate" who examined the evidence and
committed Ford for trial was not the prosecutor or in any way beholden to the prosecutor.
Rather, she was a "quasi-judicial officer]] of [a] courtQ of record," She was hired and supervised
by the judicial branch machinery. That is, she was appointed by the Judicial Council with the
concurrence of a majority of the Article VIII judges whom they serve. She had to comply with
the Judicial Council's rules, and orientation and educational requirements. She was subject to
Judicial Council performance evaluations and to Judicial counsel rules for investigations of
complaints. She had to "comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same extent as fulltime judges." § 78-3-31 (West 2004). She had notiesto the prosecuting agency. Thus, Ford was
entitled to and got an examination and commitment by a "neutral and detached" statutory
magistrate.13
For the reasons argued here and in Appellant's Brief, Ford's uncontested beyond-a-

probable cause determination was not made "by a neutral and detached magistrate;" instead, it
was made "by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferteting out crime."
Id at 449 (emphasis added).
13

Ford insists that the court commissioner "was not a member of the judicial branch."
Appellee's Brief at 29-30. He also asserts that the State "does not deny... that Mr. Ford's
preliminary hearing was not conducted by a member of the judicial branch." Appellee's
Brief at 23. As to what the State "does not deny," the State does not deny only that an
Article VIII judge did not take on the role of magistrate at Ford's preliminary hearing. The
State has not conceded that a court commissioner is "not a member of the judicial branch."
Ford does not explain how a "quasi-judicial officer" who is hired and supervised exclusively
by the judicial branch, and who is subject to all of the rules that govern die judicial branch is
not "a member of the judicial branch." In any event, as explained in the text, the fact that a
court commissioner is hired and controlled by the judicial branch gave to Ford all section 13
guaranteed. It assured that he was not forced through a criminal trial on nothing more than
the prosecuting agency's say so. Rather, he went to trial only after a "neutral and detached"
"quasi-judicial officer" examined the evidence and found that it was sufficient to meet the
probable cause standard necessary to commit him for trial
12

reasonable-doubt conviction is not void because a "neutral and detached" court commissioner,
who had to be law trained and have criminal law experience, examined the evidence and
committed Ford for trial after making the requisite and uncontested probable cause finding.
Also for the reasons argued here and in Appellant's Brief, that is true even if the legislature
technically violated Article VIII by allowing a "quasi-judicial officer" who is wholly controlled
by the judicial branch to make an uncontested probable cause determination.
IV,

FORD HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT ALLOWING A COURT
COMMISSIONER TO PRESIDE AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A
CORE JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
Ford argues that allowing a court commissioner to serve as a section 13 magistrate is an

unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function. As explained in point III of this reply and
in Appellant's Brief, even if Ford is correct, the delegation did not create a jurisdictional defect
In any event, Ford has not rebutted the State's arguments that a hearing before and
bindover by a magistrate is not an exercise of a core judicial function.14 Rather, this Court's clear
authority establishes the contrary. This Court clearly held in Humphry that a magistrate who
binds a defendant over for trial is not acting as a judge. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467
(Utah 1991). Because a committing magistrate is not serving as a judge, a judge does not have
to serve as a magistrate when the magistrate binds a defendant over to stand trial.
Ford nevertheless argues that because magistrates can issuefinal,appealable orders, they
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Ford also argues that allowing commissioners to preside a preliminary hearings
violates separation of powers. Appellee's Brief at 40-41. The separation of powers analysis
is inextricably tied to the unconstitutional delegation argument Sa/tLake City v. Ohms, 881
P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994). Because Ford has not established an unconstitutional delegation
of a core judicial function, he has not established a separation of powers violation.
13

do exercisefinal,judicial authority. Appellee's Brief at 27-28,39. Therefore, according to Ford,
allowing a commissioner to serve as a magistrate is an unconstitutional delegation of a core
judicial function.
Ford relies on State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), to support this argument Ford is
correct that, under Jaeger, the State may appeal a magistrate's order dismissing an information.15
However, the Jaeger Court distinguished the Humphrey reasoning on which the State relies in this
case, jfiz^recognized that Humphrey differentiated between magistrates and judges in that "the
orders of judges are appealable whereas the orders of magistrates are not, as they are
nonadjudicative." Id. at 54 n.2. However, the Court explained that when a judge serving as a
magistrate dismisses an information, "(i]t is as though [the judge], who took off his judicial hat
and put on his magistrate's hat to conduct the preliminary heating, removed that hat and put his
judicial hat back on just prior to entering his judgment of dismissal and discharge." Id. 886 P.2d
at 54 n.2.
At best, Jaeger may stand for the proposition that, when a magistrate dismisses an
information, she has exercised a core judicial function. (Of course, had the magistrate dismissed
the information against Ford, he would not have complained.) However, both Jaeger and
Humphry recognize that, when, as here, a magistrate commits the defendant to the district court
for trial, it has not entered a final order. In that circumstance, the magistrate "ha[s] [done]
nothing more than move the case along by issuing a routine interlocutory bind-over order, as
was the case in Humphry and as happens following the vast majority of preliminary hearings."
15

This result follows because the State cannot refile and has no other way to challenge
the dismissal order. Id. at 54-55.
14

Id. Because the commissioner did not enter a final adjudication when it bound Ford over for
trial, she did not exercise a core judicial function. Compare Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850-53 (giving
commissioners the authority to enter final adjudications is an unconstitutional delegation of
judicial authority).
The State also argued in its Appellant's Brief that the magistrate's bindover order did not
constitute a core judicial function as defined by Ohms because "a district judge may review a
commissioner's probable cause determination subsequent to a bindover, and the district judge's
review requires no deference to the commissioner's decision." Appellant's Brief at 17-18. Ford
responds that this argument is faulty because, according to him, a bindover order, like a search
warrant, "is immediately enforceable, as no further judicial determination is necessary to
bindover the accused." Appellee's Brief at 37.
This argument flies in the face of Humphrefs plain language. There, this Court
recognized that the bindover order merely "requires the defendant cto answer [the information]
in the district court"' Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465 (citation omitted, alteration in Humphrey). "At
that point, the district court has the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether
its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show no
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion." Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added).
Further, unlike the search warrant situation at issue in State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah
1998), the judicial review occurs before the rights that the bindover is designed to protect will
be violated A search warrant will be executed before a district judge reviews it "[OJnce armed
with an issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search and seize at will" Id. at 303.
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Although the citizen may have a later remedy upon judicial review - suppression of the illegally
seized evidence - the rights that the warrant was designed to protect already will have been
violated.
By contrast, a bindover order will not be "executed" - that is, the defendant will not have
suffered the "substantial degradation and expense" of a criminal trial - until after the district
court reviews the order. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-66. Thus, the magistrate's determination
is subject to full, non-deferential judicial review before the rights that section 13 protects are at
risk of being violated.
Ford also argues that a bindover is a core judicial function within the Ohms definition
because reviewing courts will give some deference to the magistrate's factual determinations.
Appellee's Brief at 38. However, Ohms acknowledged that court commissioners may conduct
"fact-finding hearings" without violating the constitutional proscription against delegating core
judicial functions. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 852 n.17. It is the ultimate legal adjudication that Ohms
forbids. As Humphrey demonstrates, the magistrate's legal determination that probable cause
exists to try the defendant is fully reviewable by the district court with no deference to the
magistrate.16
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The State also argued that, even if the legislature unconstitutionally delegated to
commissioners the authority to preside at preliminary hearings, the commissioner acted with
defacto authority with in the meaning of Ohms and Thomas. Appellant's Brief at 25-28. Ford
responds that he, like Ohms and Thomas, should get the benefit of his win. Appellee's Brief
at 41-42. However, Ohms and Thomas established defects in their convictions. That is,
Ohms was tried before and convicted by a commissioner who lacked the constitutional
authority to enter final adjudications. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844. Thomas was tried and convicted
on the strength of evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant that the
commissioner lacked constitutional authority to issue. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299. However, for
the reasons argued in points III and IV of this reply and in Appellant's Brief at 15-29, any
16

V.

FORD HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHT TO STATEFUNDED COUNSEL TO DEFEND AGAINST THE STATE'S POSTCONVICTION APPEAL,
Ford does not dispute that he had no right to state-paid counsel to initiate the post-

conviction action in the district court He does not dispute that he would have had no right to
state-paid counsel to appeal an adverse post-conviction judgment against him, He insists,
however, that arightto counsel attached after he won in the post-conviciton court and the State
exercised its right to appeal that decision. This is so, according to Ford, because the
discretionary, civil post-conviction action that he initiated in the district court transformed into
a non-discretionary, criminal or adminal-equivalent action on a state's post-conviction appeal.
Appellee's Brief at 42-58* This rationale undergirds all of Ford's constitutional and statutoryarguments.
Ford cites nothing to support his theory that an actionmay start as one thing and changes
to another based solely on the identity of the person who appeals an adverse judgment To the
contrary, "c[a]n action is deemed to be pendingfromthe time of its commencement until its final
determination upon appeal

"' Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 104 P. 117,119 (Utah 1909) (citation

omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). The same
discretionary, civil action that Ford started against the State is still pending and will remain
pending until this appeal concludes.
Ford insists that he has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to state-funded counsel
Ford's arguments misstate the law. According to Ford, the Sixth Amendment applies any time

unconstitutional delegation in this case does not affect Ford's conviction.
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the State attempts to use the judicial process to deprive a citizen of his liberty on the ground that
citizen has committed a crime. He continues that the State's appealfitsthis construct because,
if it succeeds, he will go back to prison. Appellee's Brief at 44.
The law refutes Ford's expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment Ford's Sixth
Amendment rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, ended when he was
convicted at trial. See, e.g., MarHne^v. CourtojAppealojCal, 528 U.S. 152,161 (2000) (the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to appeals in the criminal case). By its plain language, the Sixth
Amendment defines the rights seoired to an "accused" in "a criminal prosecution." Ford is not
an "accused." The State has not charged him with a crime and does not have to prove the
elements of any crime in this appeal. Further, as explained in Martinet which Ford has not
acknowledged, "[t]he Sixth Amendment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy
in 'all criminal prosecutions.' They are presented stricdy as rights that are available inpreparation
for trial and at the trial itself?' Martinez, 528 U.S at 159-60 (emphasis added). Ford is not seeking
representation for trial or to prepare for trial. He is defending a civil post-conviction victory in
a post-conviction appeal17
Ford's cases do not establish that he has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any level
of post-conviction review. Rather, they address the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right
17

Ford also complains that, if the State had opted to forfeit its right to appeal and
proceed direcdy to re-try him, he "unquestionably would have had the right to paid legal
representation." Appellee's Brief at 42. Ford is correct, but it does not foDow that he has a
right to counsel on the post-conviction appeal Rather, if the State loses this appeal, it still
may choose to re-try Ford. At that time, Ford again will be an "accused," the State again will
have to prove the elements of a crime before imprisoning Ford, and, as an accused facing an
action by the State, Ford again will have all the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
"to prepare for trial and at the trial itself."
18

to state-funded counsel and only in non-post-conviction review contexts. Ford cites Lassiterv.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); and Blankenship v.
Johnson, 118 F.3d 312 (5* Cir. 1997). Appellee's Brief at 44-46. Lassiter addressed the factors to
apply in determining when due process requires appointing counsel for an indigent parent in a
parental termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-35. In re Gau/thdd that due process
entitles indigent juveniles to state-funded counsel in their initial commitment proceedings when
they face what would have been a felony sentence if they were an adult In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
29-30. Tblankenship held that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles criminal appellants to statefunded counsel to defend against discretionary review granted to the State in the criminal appeal
Blankenship, 118 F.3d at 317. However, none of these cases create a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel beyond the trial and, as Martinet^ establishes, no such right exists.
Ford's Fourteenth Amendment argument fairs no better. By his own admission, he relies
on cases that address Fourteenth Amendmentrightsin contexts other than collateral challenges
to a criminal conviction. Ford's Breif at 47-48. However, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987), Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), and Halbertv. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) govern
the point at which a convicted person loses the Fourteenth Amendment right to state-funded
counsel for review of his conviction. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 32-28.
In his Sixth Amendment argument, Ford erroneously suggests that the Finky line of cases
establishes as the litmus test for determining when the right to counsel attaches is whether the
matter at hand is one that is non-discretionary as to the petitioner. According to Ford, the right
to counsel attaches because he must defend in this Court his post-conviction victory in the lower
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court Appellee's Brief at 44-46.
Ford misstates that authority. In Finky, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Supreme Court held
that there was no right to state-funded counsel in state post-conviction review. However, it did
not found that decision, as Ford suggests, on who was prosecuting and who was defending the
action. Appellee's Brief at 46. Rather, it construed the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the
right to state-funded counsel to "the first appeal of right, and no further." Id. at 555. The
Supreme Court continued that there was no right to counsel in post-conviction review because
it was "even further removed from the criminal trial" than' the discretionary criminal appeals
where no right to counsel attached. Id. at 556-57. Thus, it is the proximity to the criminal trial
that governs the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel, not the identity of the person
defending at specific stages.18
Ford also relies on Utah Const Art I, §§ 7 and 12 to support his argument that he has
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Along this same line, Ford contends that he is entitled to counsel because he is in no
different position than the appellant in Blankenship, who had to defend against the State's
discretionary review. Ford is wrong. Blankenship involved discretionary review in a criminal
appeal The Fifth Circuit held only that the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel extends
into that review when the defendant won the criminal appeal in the intermediate court and
the State asked for and received discretionary review by the State's high court Blankenship,
118 F.3d at 317. To support that holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, c"[b]ut where the
merits of the one and only appeal'an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.'... In the
instant case, Blankenship was without counsel the only time the merits of his only appeal-wait
decided against him." Id (citation omitted, emphasis in Blankenship). Ford is not defending
an intermediate win in his criminal appeal against discretionary review in his criminal appeal
Ford is over a decade and multiple post-conviction petitions past his criminal appeals. Ford
is in a vastly different position than Blankenship. The Fifth Circuit's reference to the "one
and only appeal" makes clear that it would not have extended the right to state-funded
counsel to a post-conviction petitioner defending his post-conviction win on his fourth postconviction petition in the State's post-conviction appeal
20

a state constitutional right to state-funded counsel to defend the post-conviction appeal.
Appellee's Brief at 49-53. In his section 12 argument, Ford again broadly asserts "that whenever
the State is attempt to regain the right to imprison on the basis of a violation of a criminal
statute, the right to counsel attaches." Appellee's Brief at 51. The law does not support this
broad assertion.
Section 12 clearly does not apply because section 12 applies only in criminal proceedings.
See Neelv. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994). This is not a criminal proceeding. See
previous argument in this point, Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 27-30. In fact, this Court's
precedent to the effect that the rights section 12 guarantees only to a criminal defendant do not
attach in parole revocation proceedings refutes Ford's argument that a proceeding becomes
criminal within the meaning of section 12 any time that the outcome may result in
incarceration.19
Ford's reliance on Julian v. State, 966 R2d 249 (Utah 1998) and Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994), is also misplaced* Appellee's Brief at 51. In fact,
those cases undercut his argument that a post-conviction petitioner has a right to counsel under
19

Ford purports to distinguish Neel because it involved a parole grant hearing rather .
than a parole revocation hearing. Appellee's Brief at 50. However, Neel makes clear the
Court did not limit its conclusion to parole grant hearings. Rather, the Court tied its section
12 analysis to its Sixth Amendment analysis. It continued that, "|I]f the Sixth Amendment
does not guarantee the right to counsel in a parole revocation hearing, it certainly does not
guarantee that right in an offender's initial post-revocation parole grant hearing." Neel, 886
P.2d at 1103-1104 (emphasis added). In a later case, this Court stated categorically that
"parole proceedings" are not criminal proceedings to which the rights that a criminal
defendant enjoys will attach. The Court did not distinguish parole grant proceedings from
parole revocation proceedings. Monson v Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1030 (Utah 1996). See also
Malek v. Friel, 2004 UtApp 237U (citing Neel for the proposition that parole revocation
proceedings are civil; therefore, there is no right to counsel).
21

section 12. In Parsons, Justice Zimmerman opined that the distinction between the criminal
proceedings and post-conviction review was a fiction, and that post-conviction review was an
integral part of the criminal process. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 530-31. He would have recognized
a right to state-funded counsel in post-conviction review. Id. However, only one justice joined
him. Id. at 531. Even more telling, when Justice Zimmerman repeated those sentiments in
Julian, 966 P.2d at 259, he failed to garner any votes, including that of the justice who joined him
in Parsons. Thus, this Court has never "suggested" that post-conviction petitioners have the right
to state-funded counsel at any level of post-conviction review.20

^ o r d also relies on State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887 (Utah 1971), for the proposition that
section 12 guarantees him state-funded counsel in this post-conviction appeal because, if he
loses, he may return to prison. Appellee's Brief at 49-50. However, Eichler w&s not a postconviction proceeding or any other kind of civil appeal It was an appeal from a probation
revocation initiated in the criminal case, where section 12, on which this Court relied, facially
applies. Therefore, Eichler does not stand for the broad proposition for which Ford cites it
that a section 12 right to counsel attaches in proceedings outside of the criminal process
where a person may be returned to prison. Further, Neel, Monson, and Makk, discussed in the
text, make clear that section 12 does not apply outside of the criminal prosecution.
For this reason, Ford's criticism of the State for relying on Beal v. Turner, 454 P.2d 624
(Utah 1969) is misplaced. The State cited Beal tot the proposition that Art I, § 7 due process
does not guarantee counsel at parole revocation proceedings. Appellant's Supplemental Brief
at 26 (citing Beal, 454 P.2d at 625). Eichler did not overrule Beal, as Ford suggests.
Appellee's Brief at 50. Rather, as stated, Eichler was a criminal appeal and relied on section
12, which defines the rights of criminal defendants. Beal'was a civil habeas case and
addressed section 7 due process rights. Beal, 454 P.2d at 625. Further, Eicbkr cited to Beal,
but did not state that it was overruling Beal. Eichler, 483 P.2d at 424 n.6. Because Eichler and
Beal addressed different constitutional provisions in different kinds of proceedings, one
criminal and the other civil, Eichler did not overturn Beal. In fact, those cases support the
State's argument tliat section 12 does not apply outside of criminal proceedings.
Admittedly, the basis for the Beal decision is unclear and, if it relied on the idea that a
parolee has no liberty interest in his continued freedom, Neel docs overrule it See Neel, 886
P.2datll01. See also Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 26 n/7. However, Neel nowhere
intimates that a parolee facing possible re-incarceration has a blanket right to counsel, and
the cases on which it relies stand for the proposition only that there may be some
circumstances where due process requires providing counsel at a parole revocation
22

Ford's invitation to craft a section 7 due process right to state-funded counsel to defend
post-conviction appeals also is unavailing. As explained in this point and Appellant's
Supplemental Brief at 26, whether Ford actually has a legally cognizable liberty interest is still
under review.
Further, Ford's section 7 argument rests, as it did below, on little more than a bare
assertion that the Court should create a right to counsel to defend the state post-conviction
appeal because it would be fair. The State constitution does not provide a blank slate to write
policy for the State. Rather, the Court's duty in discerning the rights secured by the Utah
Constitution is to discern the people's intent American Bush v. City ofSouth Salt Lake, 2006 UT
40 f 12 n.3, andffi[77 and 84,140 P.3d 1235 (Durrani, J., concurring).21 The people have made
that intent manifest they have provided for state-funded counsel in death-penalty postconviction cases; all other petitioners are relegated to representing themselves or to
representation by pro bono counsel Compare §§ 78B-9-109 and 202.22
Moreover, if the state framers had intended to provide counsel to persons collaterally
challenging a criminal conviction, they knew how to do it They specifically provided counsel
to criminal defendants. They did not do the same for post-conviction petitioners. Thus, the

proceedings. See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 26 n.7. Also as argued a parolee has a
greater liberty interest than Ford. In any event, all of the law refutes Ford's broad
proposition a person is entitled to counsel he may be re-incarcerated. Appellee's Brief at 51.
^Ford never even acknowledges the State's argument under American Bush or attempts
to satisfy it pre-requisites for fashioning a state constitutional rule.
^The State recognizes that Ford claims that the Indigent Defense Act rather than the
PCRA applies to the counsel issue in this case. Of course, if the Court agrees, there would
be no need to craft a state constitutional remedy, as Ford invites the Court to do.
23

Utah Constitution's plain text suggests that the framers did not consider state-funded counsel
to be integral to defending in the appellate courts a post-conviction win in the district courts.
See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 30-31.
Ford's fairness argument also is counter-intuitive. Ford concludes that it would not be
fair to make him defend his post-conviction victory pro se. However, he has not disputed that
he had no due process right to counsel to attain that victory in the first place. He has not
explained why it was fair to require him to take on the burden pro se of proving his entitlement
to post-conviction relief, but it would be unfair to require him to defend it where the burden of
upsetting that victory has shifted to the State. His bare conclusion that this distinction exists is
insufficient for resorting to the state constitution to overwrite the legislature's determination of
when Ford is entitled to state-funded counsel. Cf. State v. Honie,2002 UT 4 Tf61 n.7,57 P.3d 977
(declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated in "anymeaningful fashion" why the Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create the
proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. S63.23
Finally, as detailed in the Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 9-18, the IDA applies only
to criminal cases and only to persons "under arrest" and facing a "criminal charge." Ford is not
under arrest or facing a criminal charge. It does not apply, as Ford mischaracterizes it, merely
because a prior conviction will result in his re-incarceration.24

^Ford's argument that providing paid counsel would facilitate the accuracy of this
appeal's outcome also does not justify creating a right to counsel The same could be said of
the proceeding below, where Ford does not dispute that he had no right to counsel
24

Ford also asserts that the "criminal" characterization cannot govern the IDA's reach
"because the IDA applies to juvenile proceedings, which are civil proceedings." Appellee's
24

CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued here and in the State's opening briefs, the post-conviction court
erroneously vacated Ford's uncontested beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conviction and erroneously
appointed state-funded counsel to defend that victory on appeaL
DATED March 25,2008.
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Brief at 54. Ford provides no citation for his statement that the IDA applies to juvenile
proceedings. In fact, the statement appears to be false. The Juvenile Court Act, not the
IDA, provides for state-funded counsel to represent indigent juveniles. See In re W.B.J., 966
R2d 295,297 and n.2 (Utah App. 1998)
Of course, if the State loses this appeal and chose to re-try Ford, he would be entitled
to counsel under the IDA if he is indigent
25
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